The economics of markets and platforms

Advances in the study of both markets and platforms contribute to economics. Platforms are typically digital markets, although platforms can designate markets generally. So, the economics of markets and the economics of platforms are one and the same. Platforms show the critical role of intermediaries in endogenous price adjustment and market clearing. The platform model remedies problems with general equilibrium analysis by combining and extending the basic Walrasian and Marshalian market models. The analysis of platforms provides explanations for the bid–ask spread, including market power, search costs, matching costs, adverse selection, and moral hazard. The study of platforms demonstrates the importance of participation and coordination in the formation of markets. The discussion emphasizes that platforms have significant implications for the theory of the firm. The analysis further considers how platforms affect innovation and entrepreneurship.     

Paymasters and Assurance Providers: Exploring Firms’ Discretion in Selecting Non-financial Auditors

Journal of Business Ethics - Ethical issues in non-financial auditing are increasingly under scrutiny and questions have been raised about the impartiality and independence of audits. Among many...     

Contracting and Reporting Conservatism around a Change in Fiduciary Duties*

We exploit an influential 1991 Delaware court ruling to examine simultaneously two types of conservatism that play important roles in resolving creditor–owner agency conflicts: contracting conservatism and reporting conservatism. The ruling expanded managerial fiduciary duties in favor of creditors for Delaware-incorporated firms in the vicinity of insolvency. In those firms, following the ruling, debt contracts are less likely to include conservative adjustments to accounting numbers used for covenant compliance (i.e., contracting conservatism decreases), while public financial reporting becomes more conservative (i.e., reporting conservatism increases). The decrease in contracting conservatism is concentrated in firms that exhibit a greater increase in reporting conservatism, suggesting that reporting conservatism is more cost-effective in resolving agency conflicts. In addition, the substitution effect is more pronounced in firms facing greater business uncertainty and firms with greater board independence.     

Just because we can…: a review of Beth Shapiro,Life as we made it: how 50,000 years of human innovation refined- and redefined-nature

Journal of Bioeconomics -     

Reviewing the Field of External Knowledge Search for Innovation: Theoretical Underpinnings and Future (Re-)search Directions

The field of external knowledge search for innovation has a long tradition and has inspired several schools of thought resulting in a rich and burgeoning body of research. However, the field suffers from two key limitations. First, the pluralism of research across multiple disciplines impedes our attention to the field as a whole, including its intellectual structure and core ideas. Second, recent developments in the business environment and key new ideas in the field complement taken-for-granted approaches and provide new opportunities for knowledge search. Based on a systematic co-citation analysis, we provide a reflective review of the literature and make several contributions. We integrate existing research across disciplines and offer a synthesis of a fragmented research landscape to present a global view of the field. Moreover, we propose a novel external search concept and introduce the idea of “decoupled search.” Leveraging our synthesis and conceptualization further, we recommend future research directions for the entire field of external knowledge search for innovation.     

JUST A BIG MISUNDERSTANDING? BIAS AND BAYESIAN AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION

I present a model of affective polarization—growth in hostility over time between two parties—via quasi-Bayesian inference. In the model, two agents repeatedly choose actions. Each choice is based on a balance of concerns for private interests and the social good. More weight is put on private interests when an agent's character is intrinsically more self-serving and when the other agent is believed to be more self-serving. Each agent Bayesian updates about the other's character, and dislikes the other more when she is perceived as more self-serving. I characterize the effects on growth in dislike of three biases: a prior bias against the other agent's character, the false consensus bias, and limited strategic thinking. Prior bias against the other's character remains constant or declines over time, and actions do not diverge. The other two biases cause actions to become more extreme over time and repeatedly be “worse” than expected, causing mutual growth in dislike, that is, affective polarization. The magnitude of dislike can become arbitrarily large—even when both players are arbitrarily “good” (unselfish). The results imply that seemingly irrelevant cognitive biases can be an important cause of the devolution of relationships, in politics and beyond, and that subtlety and unawareness of bias can be key factors driving the degree of polarization.     

Privacy concerns,internal political efficacy,intrusiveness, and voter resistance to the acceptance of political mobile marketing campaigns

Political parties increasingly rely on information systems‐based approaches to present their messages, engender voter participation, and solicit voter support. Although research is being conducted on how mobile devices, mobile Internet, and social media are used to galvanize voters' participation in the political process, there is an observable dearth of research on how the use of these approaches by politicians might be resisted by voters. This study examines the antecedents of voter resistance to political mobile marketing campaigns with a conceptual model, and it employs reactance and internal political efficacy theories. Data for the empirical testing of the conceptual model were obtained through a survey of 971 South African voters. The findings of the study suggest that the proposed model provides a reasonable explanation of voter resistance to political mobile marketing campaigns and identifies privacy concerns, intrusiveness, and internal political efficacy as salient factors underlying voter resistance to political mobile marketing. The findings further suggest that internal political efficacy significantly moderates and reinforces the positive impact of privacy concerns on resistance. These findings provide important guidelines for reducing voters' resistance to political mobile marketing campaigns. They also provide a point of departure for future research into this relatively unexplored but potentially fertile domain.     

Aggregative games and oligopoly theory: short-run and long-run analysis

We compile an IO toolkit for aggregative games with positive and normative comparative statics results for asymmetric oligopoly in the short and long run. We characterize the class of aggregative Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly games, and the subset for which the aggregate is a summary statistic for consumer welfare. We close the model with a monopolistically competitive fringe for long-run analysis. Remarkably, we show strong neutrality properties in the long run across a wide range of market structures. The results elucidate aggregative games as a unifying principle in the literature on merger analysis, privatization, Stackelberg leadership, and cost shocks.     

Assessment Regressivity and Property Taxation

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - Homestead exemptions typically produce a moderately progressive statutory incidence for the property tax in the US when progressivity is measured...